Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries by Simon Kuznets
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries





Chapter Title: Population Change and Aggregate Output
Chapter Author: Simon Kuznets, Richard E. Quandt, Milton Friedman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2392
Chapter pages in book: (p. 340 - 367)Population Change and Aggregate Output
SIMON KUZNETS
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
i. Introduction
FoR the modern period, that is, since the end of the i8th century, the
available statistical records reveal no cases in which the prevalent sub-
stantial rises in population were accompanied by secular declines in per
capita product. To be sure, there were sharp drops in total and per
capita output—occasioned in the underdeveloped countries by crop
failures and in the developed countries by cyclical recessions.In the
underdeveloped countries population increase, occurring under con-
ditions of pre-modern agriculture and primitive transportation and
industry, can be viewed as a factor in the persistence of a low per capita
standard of living, and hence in the catastrophic impact of famines. Yet
the long-term statistical records, error-prone as they are for such countries
as India and Egypt over the first half of the 20th century, give no clear
indication of a long-term decline, although they do show failure of the
low per capita income to rise. The evidence thus suggests that in modern
times secular rises in population have been accompanied by secular rises
in aggregate output—for many countries so large that there was also a
marked secular rise in per capita product.'
It appears that population growth, despite pressure on the limited
stock of natural resources and man-made capital, has permitted sub-
stantial rises in product per capita, particularly in countries with a social
framework attuned to modern technology.However, the empirical
evidence, at least in its present state, is insufficiexit for a detailed analysis
of the impact of population growth on the growth of aggregate output.
While it reveals marked contrasts among countries with respect to growth
of income per capita, it does not suggest that differences in the rate of
population increase are an important variable in accounting for these
contrasts.In the discussion that follows, we must, therefore, resort to
speculation.
1InTable z of my paper "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations:
i,"EconomicDevelopment and Change, Vol. v, no. i,October,1956, p. 10,eighteen
countries that show secular growth of population show also a substantial rise in per capita
product. Ireland, in the nineteenth century, shows a decline in population and a rise in
per capita income.
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The theme is a broad one—the impact of secular growth of population
on per capita output.I speak of growth rather than, decline because it
has been, and is likely to be, far the more prevalent pattern; and I focus
on per capita output, because any conclusion concerning the contribution
of population growth to the rise in per capita output leads to obvious
inferences for aggregate output.Finally, a word about the drift of the
speculations that follow. My impression is that recent professional (and
popular) literature has emphasized the disadvantages and dangers of
popu}ation growth—the drain upon irreproducible resources, upon
capital accumulation, upon the organizing capacity of societies, and so
on. Little can be added to these arguments. But as a matter of balance,
I propose to dwell upon the positive contributions of population growth
—admitting that they must eventually be weighed against the negative
effects.
2. PopulationProducers
An increase in population means, other conditions being equal, an
increase in the labor force. The precise contribution to the labor force
will differ depending upon whether population growth is caused by a
decline in the death rate, by net immigration, or by an increase in the
birth tate. The differences are of great importance, since reduction in
the death rate of the working population or net immigration (usually of
persons in the prime working years of life) minimizes the cost of invest-
ment in bringing infants to the age of effective participation in the labor
force. We recognize these important differences but prefer not to
complicate the discussion by treating them separately.
Let us assume that, the labor force increases at the same rate as total
population (or somewhat less if there is an increase in the birth rate).
This increased labor force will be able to turn out as 'much or more
product per worker (and hence per capita 'of total population) if it is
equipped with the same amount of capital as, or greater amount than,
was previously available per worker; and if the reproducible capital-
output ratio remains the same or decreases. The latter "if" takes account
of the possible effect of pressure upon the limited supply of irreproducible
resources:if such pressure develops, there may be need for more man-
made capital per unit of output, or for some chain of substitution and
technological innovation.
I shall deal with the supply of capital in the section below. Here, the
point to be stressed is that capital investment must include not only
material goods, but the even more important input into education and
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training of the population—a factor of particular relevance if population
growth stems from the birth rate rather than from the death and immi-
gration rates. Obviously, the productive contribution of these additional
numbers is as dependent upon their education and skills as upon the
material capital equipment with which they are provided.
Let us assume further that capital investment, thus broadly conceived
to include the raising and training of the new generations, is at least as
large per capita for the additions to the labor force (B) as for the already
existing labor force (A). What are the reasons for assuming that the per
worker productivity of A + B would be greater than that of A and, that,
therefore, under the conditions given (constant proportions of labor force
to population), per capita income would also be higher? Three somewhat
different reasons can be advanced.
The first is connected with the distinctive assumption that there exists
in the country a variety of unexploited natural resources and that addi-
tions to the labor force would permitgreater utilization of these resources.
This utilization, combined with a more specialized division of labor
would, in all probability, lead to a greater product per worker. The crux
of this argument lies in two points: (a) an increasing density of population
spreading to formerly uninhabited parts of the country brings into use
resources previously inaccessible, and the wider base of natural resources
warrants the expectation of a higher per worker productivity;(b) a
larger labor force permits a more intensive division of labor with whatever
higher productivity benefits attach thereto.This is certainly a special
case, but it should be kept in mind in view of the experience of several
countries in the Western hemisphere. For example, the history of Brazil
and even of Canada suggests that the diverting of most of the available
immigration from Europe to the United States deprived these countries
of an influx of immigrants before World War I (and perhaps even after)
that could have contributed to a greater rise not only in aggregate output
but even in output per capita. There may be countries in the world
today in which a more intelligent and liberal immigration policy would
mean an impetus to the growth of both aggregate and per capita product.
Second, there is the argument concerning the greater mobility of a
growing than of a stagnant labor force, advanced by J. M. Keynes when
the specter of stagnant or declining population haunted the advanced
Western economies.2 It is the younger groups in the labor force who are
most mobile—in space and within the productive system—since, unlike
2Seehis "Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population," The Eugenics
Review, Vol. xxix, no. 1, April, 1937, pp. 13—17.
326POPULATION CHANGE AND AGGREGATE OUTPUT
older workers, they are not committed to family and housing or to
established positions.This greater mobility is particularly true of new
entrants into the labor force, who naturally veer toward those sectors that
are likely to spearhead the country's economic growth, and who are
oriented toward these sectors even in their training within the educational
system.
There is an important related aspect. Population growth may be due
either to or to a substantial rate of natural increase (or to
both). In the latter case, there are likely to be sizable differences among
various social groups and various parts of the country (for example,
between the lower and upper income groups, and between the countryside
and the Cities) in the rates of their natural increase. Such differences are
usually negatively correlated with differences in economic growth
tunities:while the transition to industrializationisoccurring, the
countryside and smaller cities with their lesser economic growth oppor-
tunities are likely to have higher rates of natural increase than the larger
Cities with their greater growth potentials; similarly, the rates of natural
increase of low income groups are likely to be higher than those of high
income groups with their greater economic opportunities.It follows that
the realization of economic growth potentials is contingent upon a vast
internal migration—movement of people from the country to the cities,
and within the cities from places of lesser to those of greater economic
promise. A substantial rate of population growth means, then, either a
greater rate of immigration from abroad or a greater rate of internal
migration, or both. This migration may be supplementary to the special
mobility propensities of the young entrants into the labor force.
The importance of mobility in the distribution of human resources in
response to the differential growth possibilities in the economy can easily
be underestimated. Modern economic growth is characterized by rapid
structural changes, shifts in importance among industries, and in their
location within the country's economy. Stickiness in the response of the
labor force to such potential changes can be a serious obstacle to economic
growth and greater per capita product.If insufficient labor flows to
rising economic opportunities, the relative cost of labor and the relative
price of the product remain too high to permit expansion of output to the
full potential.Conversely, if the labor force in relatively deteriorating
economic opportunities remains attached to them, the national level of
product per worker and per capita is not likely to rise. A young or
otherwise mobile group within the labor force is therefore strategically
important.Moreover, a migrant who has severed familial and other
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noneconomic ties is a more adaptable economic agent than a person who,
like a stationary stone, is overgrown with the moss of his habitual patterns
of life.It follows that population growth, in contrast to population
stability, may, because of the greater mobility and adjustability of human
resources, be conducive to higher per worker (and hence per capita)
levels of output; and this may be true, within limits, of greater vs. lesser
population increase.
The third argument is perhaps the most far-reaching. The greatest
factor in growth of output per capita is, of course, the increasing stock of
tested, useful knowledge. The producers of this stock are the scientists,
inventors, engineers, managers, and explorers of various description—all
members of that population whose growth we are considering. Assume
now that, judged by native capacities (and they do differ), 0.05percent
of a given population are geniuses, anotherper cent are possessors of
gifts that may be described as talent, and another i0.0 percent have
distinctly higher than average capacity for fruitful search for facts,
principles, and inventions. (The grades of native ability and percentages
are, of course, purely illustrative, and would probably be changed by an
expert in this field.)Since we have assumed the education, training, and
other capital investment necessary to assure that the additions to the
population will be at least as well equipped as the population already
existing, the proportion of mute Miltons and unfulfilled Newtons will be
no higher than previously.Population growth, under the assumptions
stated, would, therefore, produce an absolutely larger number of geniuses,
talented men, and generally gifted contributors to new knowledge—
whose native ability would be permitted to mature to effective levels
when they join the labor force.
We now face the question whether an increase in the absolute number
of these contributors to new knowledge is likely to produce increasing,
constant, or diminishing returns per head. Returns in this case mean
potentially useful knowledge in the form in which it can have major
effects on economic production—as has been the case in the modern
period. My answer inclines strongly toward increasing returns—for two
reasons. The first lies in the interdependence of knowledge of the various
parts of the universe in which we human beings operate—in the sense
that greater knowledge of chemistry contributes to greater knowledge of
physics, and progress in both of these contributes to greater knowledge of
physiological and biological functions. In the same sense, discoveries and
inventions in the field of tensile strength of metals contribute to discoveries
and inventions in the field of electric currents; and even new devices in
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social engineering in one field (for example, corporate organization)
facilitate new organizational devices in other fields (for example, credit
instruments). A greater supply of people who can contribute to new
knowledge may therefore mean a better coverage of a variety of inter-
related fields, and where discoveries so complement one another, econo-
mies achieved are likely to make for a higher output per worker than
would be possible for a smaller group whose coverage of these different
but related fields is, perforce, spotty.Second, creative effort flourishes
in a dense intellectual atmosphere, and it is hardly an accident that the
locus of intellectual progress (including that of the arts) has been pre-
ponderantly in the larger cities, not in the bucolic surroundings of the
thinly settled countryside. The existence of adequately numerous groups
in all fields of creative work is one prerequisite; and the possibility of
more intensive intellectual contact, as weil as of specialization, afforded
by greater numbers may be an important factor in stepping up the rate
of additions to useful knowledge. While, for obvious reasons, no simple
measure of the stock or flow of new knowledge is available, the course of
development of science, technology, and the useful arts suggests acceler-
ation rather than retardation, with no diminishing returns, even taking
account of the large in the human resources flowing into this
particul4r area of activity. Compared with the two factors mentioned
above as likely to make for greater per capita productivity of larger
numbers of creators of new knowledge, the possibility of diminishing
returns is remote: the universe is far too vast relatively to the size of our
planet and what we know about it.Recent spectacular changes in the
means of exploring the universe and the wide possibility of new, and
eventually usable, knowledge that they suggest, only serve to strengthen
this point.
Growth of economic output is a function of the growth of the stock of
tested knowledge. Since, on the assumptions stated, population increase
adds proportionately to the number of creators of new knowledge, it
should result in at least a proportional addition to the stock of tested
knowledge, and, therefore, to growth of product per capita at least as
large as that in the past.If, for reasons suggested just above, we also
assume increasing returns on output of new knowledge, per head of
knowledge-creator and hence per head of population, we may infer that,
ceteris paribus, population growth will contribute to greater growth of per
capita product.3 The argument is clearly venturesome; for example, it
3Iam indebted to Professor Moses Abramovitz for a comment that led me to restate
this argument in a form different from the original.
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implies a theory of production of knowledge such that a smaller number
of humans could not be compensated for by more intensive training. And
I am. sure that other objections could be raised, but for the present let
me advance this argument as a plausible hypothesis which merits attention
if only because of the far-reaching importance of the issues it poses.
Two final comments in this connection may be relevant.First, the
argument stresses the importance of human beings not as producers of
commodities and services, but as producers of new knowledge—as the
only carriers of the learning and creative ability that provide the basis for
our economical and social progress. This concept is quite close, of course,
to the idea of the divine spark in human beings, which is at the core of
much religious resistance to policies aimed at limitation of population.
Passing over these matters, which are beyond my ken and interest, let me
just point Out that there is an element of sound instinct behind such
resistance: insofar as it is possible to give the new generations the educa-
tion and other requisites of Homo sapiens, failure to increase means failure
to add to the possible carriers of light and knowledge—and the implicit
losses may be far larger than the costs avoided.
Second, we should recognize that the creative and educated groups in
the developed economies—and they are the central reference point here
—serve partly, and should serve more fully, the economic needs of the
whole world, not merely of their own countries. Knowledge is trans-
national in its application, and the returns on the input of effort into new
discoveries, inventions, improvements, and so on, should be measured in
terms of increased output per worker not only in the country of origin
but elsewhere. In that sense, greater population growth that leads to a
substantial increase in the cadres of creative workers at various levels—
and this is likely to occur in developed economies alone, although there
have been striking isolated instances elsewhere—may produce a greater
rise in product per worker both in those countries and elsewhere than
would result from lesser or no population growth.
3. Population as Savers
All the arguments above claiming that population increase may contribute
to a higher per capita product are contingent upon the provision of
sufficient capital to educate and train the additional workers, equip them
with adequate tools, and implement the inventions and innovations they
may introduce. We should now consider whether population growth
impedes capital formation. A family with ten children is not.likely to be
able to spend as much on the education and training of each as a family
330POPULATION CHANGE AND AGGREGATE OUTPUT
with two, nor is it likely to contribute as much to the savings that financà
material capital formation. Generalizing this case, we could argue that
population growth, in and of itself, reduces the resources for investment
in training and reproducible capital per head of new additions to popula-
tion.If this argument were valid it would severely limit all those
advanced above because the assumption of adequate capital would be
removed.
The contention just set forth may be unchaliengeable for under-
developed countries, but in the advanced economies the situation is not
that simple and determinate.There are reasons to assume that any
private failure to make the proper investment in education and training
can easily be corrected (and in many cases has been so corrected) by
public action, and that the very process of population growth contributes
to an increased flow of savings to finance additional material capital
formation.
We begin with the case where population growth, stemming from
natural increase, may result in inadequate investment in the education
and training of the younger generation (I include all expenditures needed
to develop an effective member of society, over and above bare suste-
nance). Such inadequacies may result either from inability of the family
unit to cover the necessary costs;or, despite such ability, failure to
appreciate the need. In either case, the shortfall, relative to the economic
output of the advanced economies, is likely to be small; and in the past
many countries have instituted free primary education, subsidies for higher
education, etc. We are positing here limits to the birth rate: naturally,
if every family unit attempts to raise twenty children, the problem assumes
different dimensions. But we shall deal with this qualification toward the
end of the paper, since it is relevant to most of the arguments here.
The effects of population increase on the, possible shortage of savings
to finance material capital formation pose a more serious problem.
Indeed, it is the central problem in this section because we are assuming
now that investment in raising and educating the younger generation is
adequate. Consequently, the additional drain upon resources represented
by population increase affects material capital formation alone. Can we
assume that in the very process of population growth some forces emerge
that tend to augment savings and hence Several such
forces can be suggested.
First, there is little ground for supposing that where population grows
by natural increase, the added outlay by either parents or society is all
at the expense of otherwise proportionately larger savings.So far as
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private spending-saving units are concerned, it is not clear that expendi-
tures on children are a substitute for savings (particularly in the advanced
economies) rather than for more consumer goods or for more leisure.
While correlations are often deceptive, one may point to the fact that the
birth rate is higher in those areas where the per capita consumer expen-
ditures are lower; and in the big cities the choice is largely between
children and a relatively more costly mode of living.Inasmuch as
children provide an incentive to work and to save, it is not certain that
the savings per child (or per future member of the labor force) generated
in a family unit with a large number of children would not be at least as
high as in the same family if it had fewer or no children. Nor is it certain
that funds allocated by governments for education mean a reduction in
governmental capital formation, or in the savings of the economic units
who pay for public education in taxes.
Second, some major components of aggregate savings tend to be raised
when population is growing. One of these, discussed in some detail in an
earlier paper, may be briefly noted here.4 Assume that part of savings is
for retirement, to be completely offset by dissavings of the individual or
family during post-retirement years.If the labor force is constant, then,
given a fixed age at which withdrawal from the labor force occurs, and
perfect foresight in estimating the amount of post-retirement expenses,
it follows that, all other conditions being equal, positive savings in the
process of accumulation for retirement will balance post-retirement dis-
savings and the net contribution to aggregate savings will be zero. By
contrast, if population and the labor force are growing, the number Of
active members of the labor force who are saving for retirement is that
much larger than the number of the retired; and their positive savings
are larger than the dissavings of those retired. The resultant positive
contribution to aggregate savings will reflect the past rate of growth of
the labor force, and hence the past rate of population increase stemming
from the birth rate or immigration. (An increase in population resulting
from a decline in the death rates of the retired has ah opposite effect,
serving to diminish savings.)
This argument can be applied to all future-expense oriented savings.
If savings are being accumulated to finance future outlays—for a house,
a family, and so forth—the net contribution to the countrywide pooi of
savings is the excess of their flow into stock over their outflow at the end
See the author's "International Differences in Capital Formation and Financing,"
in Capital Formation and Economic Growth, edited by Moses Abramovitz, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Princeton University Press, 1955, particularly Appendix D, pp.
98—103.
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of the period /of accumulation and waiting.. For the total body of indi-
viduals, the net balance of such future-expense oriented savings will be
zero if the population is constant, assuming no indebtedness to the
business or government sector, and assuming also that the calculations
are correct. On these assumptions, growth in population will produce
an excess of accumulation over disbursements, or positive net savings.
Third, there is an indirect and somewhat elusive effect of population
increase on the consumption and savings patterns of the upper income
groups, which may be worth noting.I argued above that in a developed
country children may be a substitute for higher levels of consumption or
for more leisure.Insofar as they are a substitute for the former, greater
population growth means for those groups whose birth rate is higher than
elsewhere, a lower per capita consumption level than would otherwise
be enjoyed. This usually pertains to groups at the bottom rather than
the top half of the economic scale. There tends to be a definite gradation
of consumption expenditure through the whole structure of economic and
social groups: we find no sharp break as we move along the scale—the
consumption-savings pattern of the multimillionaires at the top is linked
with that of the mere millionaires on the next lower rung, the latter is
linked with that of the recipients of a $Ioo,ooo annual income, and so
on for the entire array. The point is that, all other conditions being equal,
particularly the size distribution of income, lower per capita consumption
expenditures at the bottom, necessitated by population increase, will
make for lower per capita expenditures and hence higher savings pro-
portions for all groups—of those savings that are not oriented to any
necessities, etc., but are a kind of automatic excess of large incomes over
limited consumption expenditures. The argument is not that the greater
impact of higher birth rates at lower income levels results in a wider
inequality in the size distribution of income (on a per capita basis), and
hence, other conditions being equal, in a greater proportion of savings.
It is rather that, with a given size distribution of income on a per capita
basis, greater population increase due to higher birth rates keeps down
the per capita consumption levels of those in the lower and intermediate
brackets who are in the childbearing and rearing ages; and that, because
of the interconnection of consumption levels in the income pyramid, it also
keeps down the consumption levels of those groups high enough in the
array to save "automatically" ana thus raises the savings of these upper
income groups.
Finally, it has been assumed throughout that the reproducible capital-
output ratio is constant, an assumption contrary to historical experience.
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The marginal capital-output ratios, and it is with these that we are
particularly concerned, have varied considerably over both the short-run
business cycle and longer periods. In the early phases of the development
of the advanced economies these ratios showed a secular rise, as in the
United States from the 1870's to World War I; in the later phases they
showed a marked decline, in the United States since the 1920's. The
problem therefore assumes different aspects in the different secular phases
of the movement of the capital-output ratios. Particularly in the declining
phase, such as that in the United States since the i 920'S, the presumed
pressure of population increase on the supply of savings to finance capital
formation would have been much less than during the period prior to
World War I.Yet the changes in the capital-output ratios are not
independent of the supply of savings or of the absolute level of the ratios
at any given time.Greater pressure on the supply of savings, other
conditions being equal, induces more capital-saving inventions, innova-
tions, and improvements;and a high capital-output ratio provides
greater incentive and more room for such capital-saving changes. The
bearing upon the present discussion is obvious:if population increase
does create greater pressure upon savings and the available stock of
material capital, inventive and managerial ability forced in the appro-
priate direction may result in a greater emphasisand success with
capital-economizing innovations than would otherwise be the case.
While this argument may seem like the resolution of a problem by a deus
ex machina, it,does seem plausible for developed economies with a variety
of resources responsive to the task.
4. Population as Consumers
The arguments advanced in the two preceding sections, if valid, justify
the expectation that population increase would lead to a higher per
capita product than would failure to increase. They implicitly assume
the adequacy of final demand, or, more precisely, a distribution between
expenditures and savings that assures full employment of resources and
the greatest growth possible with these resources, technological changes,
related social innovations,, and the demand of ultimate consumers. While
consideration of the behavior of the population as consumers is implicit
in the discussion of their .behavior as savers, 'some specific aspects of
consumption lend additional support to the suggestion that population
increase may be a positive factor in making for higher per capita product.
The first of these aspects of consumption is related to its impact on the
size of the domestic market. I argued above that population growth may
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be partly at the expense of greater leisure. On that score alone, without
considering any of the other arguments in the preceding sections, the
demand of a rapidly growing population for consumer goods would be
greater than that of a constant or slowly growing population—since even
the larger per capita demand of the latter would not be sufficient to
compensate for their smaller numbers.If the other arguments in the
preceding sections are granted, the total demand (output), including that
for producers' goods, of a rapidly growing population can be expected
to exceed that of a constant or slowly growing population. Once this is
admitted—and the larger demand would be assured even if the per capita
product of the rapidly growing population were equal to or less than the
per capita product of the slowly growing or constant population—it will
affect productivity and product per worker in ways not explicitly con-
sidered above. A larger domestic market will permit greater economies
of scale; the development of industries that, because of the larger optimum
size of their plants, are not feasible in countries with small domestic
markets unless unwarranted reliance is placed upon foreign markets;
and a more diversified productive structure providing more varied oppor-
tunities to the population. A smaller population and a smaller domestic
market would make certain industries economically unfeasible, that is,
too expensive; might limit the economies of scale for such industries as
are indispensable within the country's boundaries; and would result in
a domestic industrial structure which, because of its limited size, would
tend to be more concentrated in fewer sectors.It is reasonable, I believe,
to argue that since reliance on foreign trade is, perforce, limited, particu-
larly in these times of international strain and strife, a large domestic
market is an important prerequisite to the economies of scale of many
modern industries and to the diversification of the domestic productive
structure that provides varied opportunities for the growing population.
A higher per capita product is more likely under such conditions than
under conditions where no growth or only. slight growth of population
limits the size of the domestic market. To be sure, larger size poses other
dangers, particularly the possibilities of greater disunity among the
various parts of a large and regionally diversified population and the
consequent difficulties of making promptly and without great cost
the secular decisions essential in setting and adjusting conditions for a
country's economic growth.5 But let me limit myself at this point to the
positive aspects of population increase.
5Seediscussion of this topic in my paper, "Economic Growth of Small Nations," in
Challenge of Development, Alfred Borne, ed., The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1958,
pp. 9—23.
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Second, it is not only the size of the domestic market but its responsive-
ness to new products that is important. The technological changes that
constitute the basis of modern economic growth affect consumer goods
as much as they do the productive processes;and in a free market
economy, lack of responsiveness by individuals and families to such new
products would be a major obstacle to the growth Of total and per capita
output.It may be argued that the younger individuals and families are
more responsive to new products than the older ones. The latter have
more firmly established habits, which are largely a carryover from the
past, and they have many more commitments, e.g., most of their durable
consumer goods have already been acquired and they may find it more
difficult to incorporate many new products. Comparable differences in
responsiveness to new products may exist, at a given age and income
level, between the migrant and the settled unit:the former, uprooted
from his customary surroundings, may be freer in his choice of the new
products, and may perhaps be psychologically more disposed toward
them.It follows that population increase, accompanied as it usually is
by a higher proportion of young and migrating units, may also be associ-
ated with greater responsiveness of the body of ultimate consumers to
new goods—which in turn facilitates modern economic growth and may
contribute to a higher product per capita.
We have dealt here, and in the preceding sections, with the direct
effects of population increase on productivity, savings, and consumptibn,
and with the effects of the latter two on productivity. There are some
indirect effects of population increase, or rather effects of the general
atmosphere accompanying it.Allowing substantial immigration reflects
a faith in the country's power to absorb the immigrants and put them to
productive use, a faith in the country's future. Having children is also
evidence of faith in the future—not in the underdeveloped countries
where the motivation may be a desire for support in old age, but in the
developed countries where children are not expected to support their
parents, where family planning is an accepted pattern, and where the
social level of the majority of parents warrants the assumption of intelligent
choice in the matter. Granted, in recent decades this faith has an apoca-
lyptic tinge, colored by visions of atomic holocausts and Armageddons.
It is a faith, nevertheless, in the counery's future, unless or until terminated
by such calamities as transcend the lknits of planning of a household, a
firm, or even a country.Contrariwise, a constant or slowly growing
population is implicit evidence of lack of faith in the future.
This being the case, it can be that the climate of belief in the
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future within which population increase occurs, as compared with the
atmosphere within which no increase or very limited increase occurs, is
itself conducive to greater economic growth and greater growth of product
per capita.For it presumably encourages forward-looking ventures by
individuals planning their careers and by entrepreneurs planning their
investments. The expectation of a future in which larger markets and
wider opportunities will prevail encourages extension of capacity, both
personal and material, and it discourages the stagnation which results
when individuals cling to unsatisfactory but "safe" routine jobs or when
entrepreneurs, bankers, the labor force, and other important agents of
economic enterprise hesitate to commit themselves to ventures that
depart from the "tried and true."It is naturally difficult to assign
weights to this factor of buoyancy accompanying population increase,
when the latter is a matter of choice rather than of obsolescent patterns
of individual behavior under changed conditions. But the effect of the
implicit view of the future on decisions by entrepreneurs and households
can hardly be denied—particularly for entrepreneurs, for whom there is
an economic rationale in being more venturesome, more forward-looking,
under, such conditions than when the view of the future is pessimistic.
Greater venturesomeness, greater willingness to build for the future, is
likely to contribute to more vigorous growth of both total and per capita
product.
5. Concluding Comments
The preceding discussion has dwelt, by design, on the positive contribu-
tions that population growth may make to the increase in per capita
product; and it has been pursued largely against the background of
advanced, developed countries. The concluding remarks are addressed
primarily to qualifications, to avoid dismissal of this discussion as an
expression of exuberant, but unfounded optimism.
First, few if any of the points made are relevant to the underdeveloped
countries.By definition, the latter suffer from an acute shortage of
capital, not only for material investment but also for adequate raising
and education of their younger generations; and the whole structure of
their society is unfavorable to the adoption of many potentials of modern
technology, since it necessitates major changes that no living society can
absorb within a short period.It is, therefore, unrealistic to assume that
population increase in an underdeveloped country is followed by the
adequátç investment in both human beings and material capital, by the
advantages of greater mobility, and by the stimulus of a wider and more
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responsive market associated with population increase in developed
countries and which contribute to greater product per capita. This is
particularly true in view of the actual (or threatening) acceleration of
rates of natural increase in the underdeveloped countries resulting from the
maintenance of;oreven slight rise in, the already high birth rates com-
bined with the remarkably rapid reduction in death rates made possible
by recent revolutionary changes in public health and control of diseases.
Second, even in the advanced and developed economies, population
increase means further pressure upon limited natural resources, upon the
supply of material capital, and above all, upon the capacity of the social
and economic structure to adapt itself to it.All the factors cited in the
current (and past) literature that make for the increased burden or larger
populations—if higher per capita product is to be attained—are relevant
here.In particular, an acceleration of population increase from a pre-
viously lower rate (like a marked retardation from a previously high rate),
may mean a lag in the adjustment of economic and social institutions,
with painful consequences resulting from delaying the kind of response
that maximizes the advantages of a growing (or retarding) population
and minimizes its disadvantages.The recent delay in this country,
particularly on the part of the public sector, in responding to the obviously
increasing educational needs of our growing population is a clear case
in point, as are some of the lags in response to the reduction of immigration
and to the retardation of population growth in the igao's.
Third, for a single developed country, the impact of growth of its
population, compared with the growth of the population of its partners
in the concert of nations, should be considered. The contribution to new
knowledge and technological change that its increased population may
make would most likely become common property, after a short period
of initial, pioneering advantage; but if a country's population grows
proportionately more than that of its partners in international trade, it runs
the risk of greater disadvantages—pressure for more imports, without a
fully compensating reduction in cost of export goods and hence of exports.
This problem of external balance has not been considered at all in the
previous discussion, and yet it may impose limits upon the contribution
of population growth to the economic performance in any single country.6
Hence, even in the advanced economies, there is the question whether
the positive advantages of population increase outweigh its cost in terms
of greater pressure upon limited resources, slowly changing organizational
6Iam indebted to Dr. Hans Singer for calling my attention to this point after the
paper was presented at the conference.
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facilities, and external balance. It is at this point that the major qualifica-
tion of our discussion, and indeed of most of the analysis in the field of
relations between demographic and economic processes, becomes patent.
Obviously, there can be in any Country, no matter how advanced, too
much population growth in that its contribution to increased productivity
per head is outweighed by the costs. But how much is too much we
cannot tell in general terms and often cannot fully ascertain in specific
instances.Conversely, there can be too little growth of population in
that the various undesirable corollaries in the way of increasing rigidities,
the lag in shifting from extensive to intensive investment opportunities,
the failure to add to numbers of creators of new knowledge, and the
general pessimism about the future, are likely to outweigh the advantages
of lesser pressure upon limited resources.But, again, we do not know
how little is. too little. To put it somewhat differently, we have no tested,
or even approximate, empirical coefficients with which to weight the
various positive and negative aspects of population growth. While we
may be able to distinguish the advantages and disadvantages, we rarely
know the character of the function that relates them to different
magnitudes of population growth.
This is, of course, no excuse for not trying to secure a complete and
balanced view, and provide, if policy needs compel it, the most considered
answer to a specific problem. In particular, it is no excuse for the con-
• sistent bias in the literature in the field, in which the clearly observable
limits of existing resources tend to overshadow completely the dimly
discernible potentials of the new discoveries, inventions, and innovations
that the future may bring.Perhaps only those who are alarmed rush
into print whereas those who are less concerned with the would-be
dangers are likely to be mute. And, to be sure,. what exists can be
observed; what is yet to come can only be surmised; and scholars
naturally tend to dwell on the observable and tangible, and are wary of
pies in the skies. Yet it must be recognized that we are concerned here
with processes which have been vitally affected by additions to knowledge,
unIbreseen and undreamed of (except by Jules Verne, H. G. Wells, and
others of their ilk); and that scientific caution should not extend to the
exclusion of a dominant factor because it is difficult to grasp and fit into
a model with a determinate, and hence limit-bound, outcome.
Finally, we should note that increase in per capita product has been a
central reference point because it permitted me to handle conveniently
the assigned topic of the relation between population. change and aggre-
gate product.It is not necessarily a superior, desirable criterion for
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guidance in population policy, nor is it a dominant criterion in population
policy as currently practiced (implicitly or explicitly). For example, in
an authoritarian society managed by a power-hungry political elite, no
real concern is shown for per capita product. The aim there is to accumu-
late the maximum surplus of resources, material and human, compatible
with internal stability of the party elite, for the purpose, however ideó-
logically motivated, of extending its power elsewhere. Assume that of the
labor force in such a country, 5 per cent are the political elite;15 per
cent are its policemen, administrators, propagandists, and favored pro-
fessionals; and the remaining 8o per cent are its workers—exploited to
yield the surplus, either in labor camps, or by bamboozling propaganda
concerning the coming millennium and the threats of the rest of the
world. Now, if X of these exploited workers yields T of power-orientable
surplus, X + a might yield I + b;and the underlying population
increase would be desired by the political elite even if b/a were a lower
ratio than r/x, that is, even if, with constant per head consumption
levels of-the exploited workers, product per head declined as population
increased.
But even in free societies, where the consumer is sovereign, maximiza-
tion of per capita income may not be the paramount or even an important
aim; and population change will not be judged in these terms. A society
may prefer a smaller population, even if it means smaller aggregate and
per capita product; or, what is more likely, it may prefer a larger popu-
lation, even if it means a lower per capita product than would smaller
numbers—if the population feels itself to be in danger and considers that
there is greater safety in greater numbers. Many other criteria than per
capita income can be used for evaluating population change and formu-
lating population policy in the free countries, but they are outside the
scope of this paper. The only reason for raising this question is that any
discussion, even if it is only an attempt to interpret the past or speculate
upon the possible relations, inevitably carries policy connotations. And
it is well to emphasize that concentration of the discussion here on the
relation between population growth and per capita product does not mean
that maximizing the latter is a dominant, or even important, criteripn in
policy evaluation of population change.
COMMENT,
RICHARD E. QUANDT, Princeton University
Kuznets has observed that substantial rises in population are
usually accompanied by increases in per capita output. He poses himself
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the problem of finding causal relationships between an increase in popu-
lation and an increase in per capita output. If I understand his argument
correctly, it basically on the fdllowing three points:(i) If the
increase in population is not accompanied by a reduction in the amount
of available per worker capital (and if the capital-output ratio remains
unaltered), a certain train of events will be set in motion which will
result in ah increased per capita output;(2) An increase in population
will affect the savings behavior of tire population in such a manner that
per capita or per laborer capital remains the same or increases; The
receptivity of an increasing population to more products and new
is sufficiently high to create a favorable climate for expansion and
economic and thus also for achieving higher per capita rates of
output.
First of all, I would like to discuss the condition under which, given
Kuznets' assumptions, an increase in population leads to an increase in
per capitaol'ltput. Assumean aggregate production function
X=f(L,K) (I)
where X denotes output, L the amount of labor, and K the amouni 'of
capital.I shall assume, as does Kuznets, that the total population and
the labor force differ only by a constant factor of proportionality, that is,
L=bP ' (2)
where P denotes the population and where b is positive but less than one.
Per capita output is X/P,andwe wish to find the rate of change of this




where fL and fK are the partial derivatives of the production function.
In order to make certain that the amount of capital per worker is not
decreasing and is perhaps increasing, we must require that the marginal
increase in capital per unit addition to the labor force be no less than the
average amount of capital pei worker, that is, that '
dK K —=a—wherea￿i
dL'L —
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From weobtain that
zdKidL -—=a-— (5) Kdt Ldt
that is, the percentage rate of increase in the capital stock must not be
less than the percentage rate of increase in the labor force. Substituting





d[f(L, K)/P](JLL + afKK —f)
(7)
dt
Since P2 is always positive, an increase in the population [dP/dt> ol
leads to an increase in per capita output if and only if
fLL + afxKf(L, K) >0 (8)
Now the following possibilities exist.If a =i, thatis, if the amount of
capital per worker remains unchanged, (8) becomesfLL +JKK —f(L, K)
> o. This cannot occur if the production function is homogeneous of the
first degree. In order for (8) to be true with a =i wemust assume that
increasing returns to scale prevail in some fashion.If,forexample, the
production function is homogeneous of the second degree, it is easy to
show that (8) will be satisfied.If a> z,it is no longer necessary to
assume that there are increasing returns to scale. Returns to scale may
be constant or diminishing so long as they do not diminish too rapidly.
The argument to the effect that an increase in population tends to raise
per capita output must therefore rest on some combination of the following
factors:(i)Thatthe aggregate production function shows increasing
returns to scale;(2)thata given percentage increase in population
results in a greater percentage increase of the stock of capital; that
the form of the production function itself changes when population
increases.
Kuznets mentions each of these points in one place or another. In
support of the first proposition he advances two arguments which seem
open to some doubt. He assumes that "the reproducible capital-output
ratio remains the same or decreases" in order to "take account of the
possible effects of pressure upon a limited supply of irreproducible
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resources."However,if the increasein population (and capital)
resulted in a shortage of land and other natural resources, it would not
be reasonable to assume that the production function, expressed as a
function of labor and capital, would exhibit constant or increasing
returns.It seems that his argument might be more applicable to under-
developed economies which, however, he specifically rules out in his
discussion. He suggests that increasing population will bring into use yet
unexploited resources. Although it is difficult to debate the truth of this
assertion, the yet unexploited resources may be of inferior quality. To
use a simplified example, one may think that in a developed economy all
the highest grade coal deposits are already being mined intensively;
additional coal production could take place only by resorting to mines
which are less efficient to operate, either because of the inferior heating
quality of the coal or because of the greater labor effort required for the
extraction of a ton of coal.
Kuznets' second point is that a greater population will allow greater
specialization in production and therefore a higher output per capita.
It is unquestionably true that one can subdivide a certain specified
number of tasks among more men in such a fashion that greater speciali-
zation results.It is not clear, however, whether there might not prevail
counteracting tendencies in developed economies.I am referring to the
increasing bureaucratization of life which seems to accompany growth
in size in the developed economies. If the increase in the size of a firm
results in a more than proportionate increase in the "non-producing"
administrative staff, the economy's potential ability to achieve a higher
degree of specialization may be effectively counteracted.
A third argument is intended to show that the production function
itself may change its form in response to an increase in population.
Assuming that the percentage of people born with given native capacities
is constant, a larger population implies, other things being equal, that
more geniuses and other talented people are born in absolute terms.
conjectures that useful knowledge increases more than in pro-
portion to the number of people engaged in creating knowledge, that is,
that knowledge exhibits increasing returns to scale (of scholarship).
Finally, it is plausible to argue than an increase in the amount of know-
ledge per capita will, tend to increase output per worker. This conjecture
is a very important and highly imaginative one.It must be emphasized
that the truth of the conjecture and the magnitude of this "Kuznets
effect" are purely empirical questions.It is tempting to say that the
interrelatedness of knowledge strongly suggests that the per capita amountECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POPULATION CHANCE
of knowledge will increase with population. However, on an a priori
basis a contrary argument can also be made. The counterargument is
certainly not as persuasive as Kuznets' own and I am inclined to accept
his.However, the possibility of arguing rather on a priori
grounds about the conjecture leads me to suggest that an empirical test
of the proposition is necessary.
To turn to another point, we must examine the implications of the
requirement that a given percentage increase in the population result in
a greater (or at least not smaller) percentage increase in the stock of




Equation showsthat if the population is increasing at all, savings must
be positive and that the faster population is growing in percentage terms,
the higher must be aggregate savings. In other words, if the percentage
rate of growth of the population increased, aggregate savings would have
to increase too. Kuznets advances some reasons for aggregate savings to
increase, yet one cannot help feeling a certain degree of scepticism. He
believes that, as far as private spending units are concerned, it is not
clear that expenditures on children are a substitute for savings rather than
for more consumer goods or for more leisure. Nor is it clear, I feel, that
the opposite is not the case. In fact, it is' very plausible that an increase
in the size of the family will make some inroads on the family's ability to
save. Consider a population which is growing at 2percent per annum.
If the capital/output ratio is three, savings would have to be 6 per cent
of national product.If this population were growing at 4 per cent,
savings amounting to i2 percent of output would be required in order to
provide labor with the same amount of per worker capital as before.If,
in addition, we require that the coefficient a be greater than unity, the
discrepancy between the respective savings percentages would be greater
still.But even if we allow a to equal unity, it is not sufficient for the
population to continue to save the same amount that they did before.
As more children are born, not only must the parents deny themselves
Certain consumer goods in order to provide for the children, but they must
deny themselves additional consumer goods if savings are to increase.
Whether such behavior is plausible in a system where individuals are free
to make their savings decisions is doubtful.It is also suggested that, as
the population increases, the savings of those at the beginning of their
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earning life will exceed the dissavings of the retired and that thus aggre-
gate savings will increase. This proposition must be reevaluated in the
light of the possibility that young people may begin to save for retirement
at a later date in their lives than they used to.
It seems that the last major point of Kuznets reinforces the conclusion
that a developed economy may have difficulties in providing sufficient
savings to allow for an increase in per capita output. Granted that a
growing population is favorable for an extension of old markets and the
creation of new ones, such an expansion is basically consumption oriented.
The more the young population is in trying Out new products,
the less willing they will be to withhold an appropriate part of their
income for the purpose of capital formation. If we posit that the govern-
mental machinery operates to keep aggregate demand at a full employ-
ment level, the aggregate volume of savings may not be sufficient to
increase the stock of capital to the point where the collaboration of labor
with capital results in higher output per capita. When Kuznets mentions,
albeit with a warning, that the birth rate tends to be higher in places
where per capita consumer expenditures are lower, one cannot help
wondering about the direction of the causation.Perhaps we should
examine this problem still further to see (i) whether it is not the iow per
capita consumption which is responsible for the higher birth rate, (2)
whether the places where the birth rate is high are not also the places
where per capita savings are low, in other words, where per capita
income or output is low.
I do not know the answers to many of these questions. Kuznets has
provided a useful framework and has raised numerous tantalizing
questions. Many of these relate to empirical propositions, and I feel that
Kuznets' framework will be most useful when these empirical questiOns
are answered.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, University of Chicago and National Bureau of
Economic Research
The historical covariation of population growth and per capita output
is,of course, susceptible of a number of interpretations—it may be
historical coincidence, population growth may be the result of the growth
in per capita output, the growth in per capita output may be the result
of the population growth, or both may be the common result of other
historical forces. As Simon Kuznets notes, professional and popular dis-
cussion has in the main tended to be unfavorable to the possibility that
population growth is on net favorable to growth in per capita output.
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Yet the uniformity of the historical covariation inevitably leaves a nagging
doubt whether this interpretation can so blithely be dismissed and whether
in our analysis we may not have neglected some effects of population
growth favorable for per capita output.
The economic literature bearing on the relation between changes in
population and in output has two main themes. One is the limitation of
resources which together with the law of diminishing returns or law of
variable proportions makes population growth a factor unfavorable to
growth in per capita output. The other is the possibility of "external
economies" as the size of an industry or an economy or a trading world
grows which can have the opposite effect.
In this stimulating and imaginative paper, Kuznets attempts to render
this analysis more explicit and to extend its scope particularly with respect
to forces other than traditional external economies that• might render
population growth favorable to per capita output.In the process, he
certainly puts flesh on well-worn bones and offers much food for thought.
He does not, however, seem to me to add any additional categories of
favorable effects to those implicit in the literature.
The favorable effects Kuznets lists are of two very different kinds.
There are, first, those which are favorable in the sense that they are
reasons why population growth would on net mean a higher rate of
growth in per capita output than otherwise. These all seem to me special
manifestations of "external economies." There are, second, effects which
are favorable only in the very different sense that they tend to offset
some unfavorable effects of population growth. They are brought into
play only by virtue of the existence of these unfavorable effects and can
never counter them in full. They are not reasons why population growth
is a stimulant to economic growth but only why it may be somewhat less
of a depressant than one might at first think. They are like a long-run
rise in output along a positively sloping supply curve that can make the
long-run price rise in response to an increase in demand less than the
initial price rise but can never convert a short-run price rise into a long-run
price decline.
The first category of effects includes three items: the first and third
listed by Kuznets under the heading "population as producers," and the
first under the heading "population as consumers."
(i)InKuznets' words, "The first is connected with the distinctive
assumption that there exists...avariety of unexploited natural re-
sources, and that... greaterutilization of these resources ... combined
with a more specialized division of labor would, in all probability, leadPOPULATION CHANGE AND AGGREGATE OUTPUT
to a greater product per worker." This itself is a combination of the two
categories of effects distinguished. The "more specialized division of
labor" is an external economy, a positively favorable effect of a larger
population.The "variety of unexploited natural resources" simply
reduces the rate at which diminishing returns occur;it limits the un-
favorable effects of the expansion of population but does not render such
expansion favorable.
(2) The third item listed by Kuznets under the heading "population
as producers" is the existence of external ecOnomies in the production of
knowledge arising mainly out of the greater division of labor and special-
ization of function in intellectual activity permitted by the larger size
of the industry of creating and maintaining knowledge. This favorable
effect is further intensified by the fact that insofar as knowledge accumu-
lates, it is available to all and is not consumed in the process of being
used, an external effect of a more subtle kind.
Thefirst item under "population as consumers" is the "impact on
the size of the domestic market." This is simply a different face of (i)
above—external economies arising out of the more extensive division of
labor permitted by the greater size of the market.
All of the other items listed by Kuznets s'eem to me at best to fall into
the second category of effects distinguished—those that partly offset
unfavorable effects. Let us consider each in turn.
(i) A growing labor force imposes a need for the reshuffling of the
economy to adapt to the new conditions.Similarly, the disproportionate
growth of population in rural areas requires an additional reshuffling.
In both cases, movement of resources is required by the very factors that
give rise to "the greater mobility of a growing than of a stagnant labor
force" cited by Kuznets as the second item under "population as pro-
ducers." And this movement of resources is required simply to hold to a
minimum the reduction in initial levels of per capita income that would
occur in the absence of external economies. Kuznets gives no reason,
and it is hard to see any, why the increased mobility produced by higher
population growth is not only enough to permit the new resources to be
organized as efficiently as the old but to increase the efficiency with which
the old resources are organized.
(2) In considering "population as savers," Kuznets' first item is that
added expenditure on training and education of children is not necessarily
"all at the expense of otherwise proportionately larger savings." True
enough, but so long as any such added expenditure is at the expense of
savings, the faster population growth reduces on this ground the aggregate
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savings available for capital formation and even more the amount
available per capita. Thus the need to educate and train the younger
generation is a factor that on net renders population growth unfavorable
to maintenance let alone growth in per capita output.
(3) His forth item under this head, that "greater pressure on the supply
of savings... mayresult in a greater emphasis on and success with
capital-economizing innovations" is of the same kind. At most this can
make the deleterious effect of capital shortage less than otherwise;it
cannot convert capital shortage into a positive good—for of course if it did,
there would then be no capital shortage to act as an additional incentive.
Itisexplicit in Kuznets' analysis that more rapid population
growth requires a higher fraction of income to be saved than otherwise
in order to keep capital per head constant or increasing. The second
item on savings he lists, the stimulation of all "future-expense oriented
savings" can at best be only a partial offset to this need.If the capital-
output ratio, to take a figure relatively favorable to Kuznets' position,
were as low as 2 to i, then each one percentage poii.t increase in the
annual rate of growth of population would require additional savings of
2 per cent of annual income to keep capital per head constant. But this
would absorb an amount equal to twice the growth in aggregate income
from the faster growth in population, with constant per capita income.
Thethird item on 'savings, a possible effect of a higher rate of
population growth on the "automatic" savings of higher income groups,
is in a somewhat different category.It seems to me simply wishful
thinking, derived from a theory of savings that is not only untested
empirically, but has never even been fully and carefully elaborated
theoretically. On this level, one can as plausibly argue that there is
emulation of savings behavior as of consumption behavior, in which case
the "automatic" consumption of upper 'income classes would have the
opposite effect. And neither the one theory nor the other seems to me to
derive any support from the large amount of empirical evidence and the
fairly well elaborated theoretical analyses that we have.
(6) The greater responsiveness of a rapidly growing population to new
products, Kuznets' second item under "population as consumers" is in a
still different category. This implies a difference in tastes that makes it
hard to compare per capita output.under the alternative conditions or,
alternatively, to attach economic meaning to a mechanical comparison
—this is the kind of problem that Kuznets in some of his other writings
has taught us so much and has trained us to be wary of.The
example that has always impressed me is the difficulty of comparing
348POPULATION CHANGE AND AGGREGATE OUTPUT
Swiss and U.S. per capita incomes that arises out of the difference in
attitude to new products. Casual observation suggests that the Swiss put
far less emphasis than we on having the very "newest" and "latest" and
much more emphasis on serviceability. By their standards, much of our
so-called "production" is simply waste, involving the destruction of
perfectly serviceable houses, electrical wiring, furniture, and so on
indefinitely, in order to replace them by only moderately better items.
(7) The final item cited by Kuznets is "climate of belief in the future
within which population increase occurs," a climate conducive to
"forward-looking ventures."But this climate is not produced by the
population increase.Rather the population increase is a result of the
climate. The climate would, so far as this point alone is concerned, be
even more favorable to increased output per capita if population did not
increase. Hence the population increase is, in and of itself an unfavorable
factor, tending to offset any favorable effect of the general "faith in the
future."
This examination of Kuz nets' arguments does not of course justify any
substantive conclusion about the effect of population change on per
capita output, any more than Kuznets would claim that his own analysis
does.It does suggest that classical "external economies" are the only
category of effects we have yet found that can render population growth
positively favorable to per capita output, and that Kuznets' contribution
is, on the one hand, to spell out in more imaginative detail how these
manifest themselves, and, on the other, to force us to be somewhat more
sophisticated in evaluating the unfavorable effects of population growth.
In closing, I should like to note a point about external economies that
seems to me to be of the utmost importance and yet frequently neglected
because of our tendency to speak about a single country or a closed
economy. An extension of the market giving rise to external economies
can be achieved through more extensive international trade as well as
through a growth in the national market. And external economies pro-
duced in this way are likely to give rise to none of the unfavorable effects
accompanying external economies produced by population growth.
A striking illustration bearing on external economies in the production
of knowledge is provided by recent Indian developments. There is a
movement under way, backed by legislation, to eliminate the English
language as the primary medium of higher education and to foster the
use of native languages, with each region using its own major language
though with some emphasis also on a common language other than
English.If this movement is carried through, the effect will be in large
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measure to fragment intellectual activity and greatly to reduce inter-
communication not only between India and the rest of the world but also
among the different regions of India itself. Along the lines of Kuznets'
analysis, it is conceivable that a greater rate of population growth in each
region separately would produce external economies in the production
of knowledge, but it is ludicrous to suppose that it could do more than
offset a tiny part of the external diseconomy arising from subdividing the
economy into language areas or that it is relevant to regard the one line
of development as a meaningful substitute for the other.Yet, on a less
extreme level, this is just what is implied by our tendency to concentrate
on intra-national expansions of the market and our relative neglect of
international extension.
REPLY
I find it difficult to deal with the comments by Milton Friedman and
Richard Quandt because I agree with the substance of much of what
they say, but not with the implicit emphasis or weight. My paper was
written in an intellectual uneasiness concerning the conflict between the
pessimistic tenor of most literatwe on population growth and the historical
records that reveal association in time, in many countries, between large
increases in population and high rates of growth of per capita product.
The paper was not intended to provide an explanation of this association:
this would require far-reaching empirical, analysis, most of which has yet
to be undertaken. It was, rather, a series of speculative probings into the
possible positive contributions of population growth to the rise in per
capita product—probings that could not, under the circumstances, be
accompanied by tested weights.
Within this framework, it does not seem to me to matter whether the
positive contributions suggested are, to refer to Friedman's comments,
(a) offsets to the additional burden of larger population, (b)typesof
external economies, or (c)resultsof the wider complex of circumstances
of which population growth is a corollary not in itself favorable. In the
case of (a), offsets are welcome and significant since they leave so much
more room for net contributions of other positive effects. In the case of
(b), I am quite content. to see the positive contributions classified as
external economies, if cognizance is taken of the fact that they embrace
the production of basic knowledge and of social innovations—processes
not included in traditional economic analysis. In the case of (c),popula-
tion growth is one way of realizing the wider complex (that is, a favorable
climate of belief in the future), and without it such a climate would not
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come into being.In such case, it seems to me artificial to argue that
population increase is a pure cost, to which no credit for the effects of the
favorable climate is assigned.
Two more observations on Friedman's comments are appropriate.
First, offsets may have a dynamism of their own which carry them far
beyond the initial cost or burden that they are intended to counteract—
as has been the case with many need-provoked innovations, both techno-
logical and social. Second, it is difficult for me to entertain the proposition
that social imitation—internal demonstration effect—applies to savings
patterns as effectively as it does to consumption patterns; and I am
probably less willing than Friedman to accept the conclusions of the
existing theoretical analysis.
I am in essential agreement with Quandt's comments on the implica-
tions of my discussion for the production function, while, for obvious
reasons, it is difficult to counter his scepticism over some substantive
points, for lack of empirical evidence.It is relatively easy to find both
positive and negative effects of any trend within the complex process of
economic growth—even of such an apparently wholly favorable move-
ment as growth of the stock of material capital per worker. Thus, one
could argue that if there is too much capital relative to other factors, the
resulting inefficiency could depress our per capita product appreciably.
We could in fact apply Parkinson's law to any and all productive factors.
We are rescued from the bewildering conflict of the possible effects by a
combination of empirical constraints and realistically guided reasoning.
And in the light of both, it does seem to me that in the competition
between geniuses and incompetents, the triumph of the former, in adding
to the stock of useful (vs. worthless) knowledge, is clearly manifest; that
continuous innovations permit an increasingly effective specialization and
division of labor among larger numbers that more than offsets the effects
of Parkinson's law; and that with the increasing substitutability between
investment in human beings and knowledge and in material capital the
deleterious effects of population growth on the supply of savings (in the
traditional sense of funds available for investment in material capital) can
be quite limited.
Let me conclude by stating that the aim of the paper is to suggest
problems for further research, and that the claim of validity for any of
the speculative suggestions, if made, is intended as an irritant, not a
sedative. My purpose is to call attention to the interrelations between
population growth and economic growth, which have been studied much
less than their apparent importance in the field warrants.
351